Instead of a book review, I've decided to answer the discussion questions at the end of each chapter.
No discussion questions here, but some noteworthy ideas. Military history is the study of institutions formed by society to do violence on its behalf, the interaction of society with these institutions, and the operations of these institutions.
The Army has nine principles of war.
1. To what degree is the American Army a European Army?
The American Army draws its heritage from two separate lines of European military history. The first is the development of the modern European army; the American Army adopted many European conventions of rank, drill and ceremonies, uniforms, and organization. The second is the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the fyrd, or militia. In accordance with this ancient tradition, every male citizen of majority age registers for Selective Service, thus entering the unorganized militia.
2. How did our early colonial experience modify our European military inheritance?
The American Army's differences from the European model developed from two major factors: the American spirit and the American environment. Americans have always been a highly individualistic people. We work best when we know and value what we are working for; this has married military service with a proudly nationalist sentiment. American individualism has strengthened the militia tradition into the concept of the citizen-soldier, trained and capable of response in emergency situations, but like Cincinnatus, eager to go home when the fighting is over. The second factor, the American environment, drove the American Army to adopt new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); European armies were used to fighting in the great fields of settled lands, and found many of their TTPs unsuitable for the heavily wooded American wilderness. TTPs developed for use in wooded areas, along with technological innovation like the rifle, led to many of the individual and small unit tactics used today.
3. What did the British learn about the nature of warfare in the Americas from their initial defeats in the French and Indian War? How could this have helped them in their later fight against the "colonists"?
After several initial defeats, notably the rout of Major General Braddock's column by an inferior force of French regulars, Canadian militia, and Indians, the British learned to adopt their TTPs to the American environment. They began to employ skirmishers and scouts, often camouflaged or disguised as Indians, to secure the main body of their forces. They took advantage of cover and concealment, and learned to travel faster and lighter through dangerous areas. In short, they took advantage of maneuver, security, and surprise. Still, when appropriate, the British used the Frederickian line of battle to devastating effect.
Patriots, loyalists, and British regulars all developed new warfighting doctrine in the French and Indian (Seven Years) War that could be recycled in the Revolutionary War. Many officers of the former war returned to fight in the latter, most notably General Washington and General Gage. This provided each force with a great deal of intelligence about the other; in modern parlance, this order of battle (OB) data could have been used to develop situational templates.
4. Why did the British and American armies defeat the French and their French-Canadian allies?
The British and American forces were composed of a large number of regulars and colonial militia subsidized by the Crown. The French forces were generally smaller and more dispersed, and their Indian allies fought as an ad hoc force, not organized units bound to a French commander for the duration. The British and American forces had superior mass and unity of command. The French forces began the war with superior talents for security, surprise, and maneuver, but the British quickly adapted to this imbalance.
5. What did the British learn about the military capabilities of their American "cousins"? What should they have learned?
The British learned that the Americans were familiar with the terrain and, through their experience with hostile Indians, had recognized the value of surprise and stealth. They should have learned that the incipient American Army would be highly mobile, specializing in maneuver and only employing mass at decisive engagements, preferring the offense and placing less value on strategic positions such as forts -- all of which will, given enough time, fail.
6. Why didn’t the rifle immediately replace the musket on the battlefield?
The rifle's rate of fire was about one third that of the musket. It was also more difficult to manufacture and maintain, requiring a unique bullet mold for each hand-made piece.
1. Discuss the various differences between the Massachusetts Minutemen and the British troops they fired on during the battles of Lexington and Concord.
The Minutemen were organized militia, raised from the local populace, drilled with some regularity, and armed with their own weapons. Many of their officers had more combat experience than their British counterparts, especially in the American operating environment (OE). Unlike regular militia, the Minutemen were a rapid reaction force. The British troops were regulars with more training but less experience in the American OE.
2. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the British military system and the new American Army in the opening days of the Revolution? What challenges did each side face in its attempts to prosecute its military operations?
The American Army had experience in the OE and more popular support than the British. While it had problems recruiting and supplying soldiers, those men not enlisted were able to keep the American economy afloat and, when necessary, act as militia. The militia was unable to maintain sustained operations over great distance, but were capable of attacking British flanks or performing envelopments of isolated British outposts.
While it was largely adapted to the environment, the American Army had problems exploiting those adaptations. Initial enlistments in the Army were only for a year; the Continental Congress had not anticipated a long campaign. Component armies did not coordinate their campaigns with each other or with the commander-in-chief, General Washington. Supply was difficult and pay depended on quickly depreciating paper Continental Dollars. Recruiting was difficult, and men were hesitant to subsume their state's interests to those of the United States. Many officers and men lacked training in tactics, strategy, and logistics.
The British Army had the centralized command that the Americans lacked and was in a much better financial position. It was better trained in 18th century warfare, and retained some memory of the French and Indian War. The Royal Navy was capable of landing troops and establishing outposts at any point along the American coast and moving inland via rivers.
Like the Americans, British commanders had unattainable requests for manpower. Some of the manpower deficit was made up by mercenaries, particularly Hessians. Transporting men and materiel from Britain to American took months, and transport ships were threatened by American privateers. While the British were able to maintain control of cities and rivers, they were unable to maintain supply lines from these secured areas into the field. Nor were they able to force a decisive confrontation with the Continental Army in a European-style field engagement. Even when victorious, the British often neglected or failed to exploit their victories, letting defeated Continentals retreat. Although not as divided as the American Army, the British command was divided between Canadian and United States campaigns.
Neither army developed long-term strategy. American strategy was hampered by insufficient unity of command and the early expectation that the war would be short. British strategy was hamstrung by a similar expectation and the habit of fighting yearly campaigns, anticipating a break in fighting for winter and not planning much in advance of that.
3. Given the state of the American Army in 1776, how do you think Washington should have conducted operations in the New York City area? What should Howe have done?
The British had control of the waterways, subjecting the river banks to naval gunfire and the rapid deployment of troops. They were more interested in capturing key terrain, such as Brooklyn Heights and the two forts on the Hudson, than they were in attriting the Continental Army. Washington should have evacuated the forts and the vicinity of the river and set up a thorough surveillance and reconnaissance plan, including a screening force around the main body of his army, to keep himself apprised of British actions. Out of the direct reach of a static, traditionalist foe, Washington could've planned future offensive and defensive operations with near impunity.
Howe showed a reticence to exploit his victories and a lack of audacity, probably borne of his experience on Breed's Hill. He should've assaulted through Brooklyn Heights without digging trenches. Barring that, he should've pursued and destroyed the Connecticut militia that fled from him on Manhattan. After that, he should've made Kingsbridge his sole objective on Manhattan while instructing his Naval counterparts to patrol the rivers around Manhattan, enveloping the Continentals.
4. Discuss the element of surprise in Washington’s attacks at Trenton and Princeton. Did he make good use of this principle? What were the dangers in relying on surprise?
Washington's attack on Trenton was to take place the day after Christmas, when he hoped the enemy's security would be impaired by celebrations. Two Army columns under Washington's command were to cross the Delaware and attack Trenton from opposite directions. A militia group was to attack Bordentown to the south, and another would block the escape route across Assunpink Creek, effectively enveloping Trenton. Although the two militia groups did not reach their objectives, the surprise attack on Trenton came out as planned; forty Hessians were killed, 918 taken prisoner, and only 400 escaped. Only two Americans were killed and two wounded.
The principal danger in such a surprise attack lay in its ambitious tactics. The night was dark, and the Delaware in December was filled with chunks of ice. This prevented the two militia groups from reaching their objectives.
By 2 January, Cornwallis had reoccupied Trenton. He decided to let his troops rest a day before attacking. Washington did not afford his troops this day of rest; his army evacuated their camp during the night, leaving the fires burning to deceive enemy reconnaissance. While this was primarily a security measure, it also aided the element of surprise in Washington's next attack — while Cornwallis thought he had Washington trapped, he could not think to warn adjacent units that they were in danger of surprise attack. And Washington did surprise the British at Princeton the next morning. Three British regiments on their way to reinforce Cornwallis suffered heavy losses. After this, Washington withdrew to winter camp. Cornwallis, repeating a common British failing, did not pursue. Howe withdrew his New Jersey outposts. Washington had brought the winter season to an end with American victories.
5. What role did Congress play in setting military policy and determining military operations in the opening days of the Revolution? Why was this important?
Congress appointed general officers and a staff, set the pay scale, ratified the Articles of War, authorized personnel numbers, and charged the states with recruitment and fiduciary quotas. It did not have the ability to tax the populace, and states rarely met their assigned quotas. Personnel raised by states were often loyal to their states, not the national government, and lines of de facto authority would criss-cross. Because Americans were poorly disposed towards concentrated power, the Continental Congress had no executive and its work was done by committees.
For all its faults, the Continental Congress was the duly authorized civilian authority, and Washington was assiduous in recognizing it as such. This was paramount in earning the trust of the American government and people.
6. Why was it important to create the Continental Army in 1775 rather than relying upon the existing state militias to prosecute the war?
The existing state militias were not full-time soldiers and did not receive full-time training. Nor were they disciplined enough to engage in long-term campaigns or move freely from state to state under national control. They often fled from trained British regulars. The creation of a national army ameliorated many of these deficits and provided a concrete example of the value of unity among the states.